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ABSTRACT
Camera fingerprints based on sensor PhotoResponse Non-
Uniformity (PRNU) have gained broad popularity in foren-
sic applications due to their ability to univocally identify the
camera that captured a certain image. This fingerprint of a
given sensor is extracted through some estimation method that
requires a few images known to be taken with such sensor.
In this paper, we show that the fingerprints extracted in this
way leak a considerable amount of information from those
images used in the estimation, thus constituting a potential
threat to privacy. We propose to quantify the leakage via two
measures: one based on the Mutual Information, and another
based on the output of a membership inference test. Experi-
ments with practical fingerprint estimators on a real-world im-
age dataset confirm the validity of our measures and highlight
the seriousness of the leakage and the importance of imple-
menting techniques to mitigate it. Some of these techniques
are presented and briefly discussed.
Index Terms— Fingerprint, PRNU, Leakage, Informa-
tion theory, Membership inference.
1. INTRODUCTION
The PhotoResponse Non-Uniformity (PRNU) is a multiplica-
tive spatial pattern that is present in every picture taken with a
CCD/CMOS imaging device and acts as a unique fingerprint
for the sensor itself [1]. The PRNU is due to manufacturing
imperfections that cause sensor elements to have minute area
differences and thus capture different amounts of energy even
under a perfectly uniform light field. The uniqueness of the
PRNU has already led to a number of applications in multime-
dia forensics, both to solve camera identification/attribution
problems and to detect inconsistencies that reflect intentional
manipulations [2].
Since the PRNU is a very weak signal, its extraction re-
quires the availability of a number (often dozens) of images
known to be taken with the camera under analysis. Although
several extraction algorithms (both model- and data-driven)
exist [1], [3], all of them perform some sort of averaging
across the residuals obtained by denoising the available im-
ages. The most prevalent method [1] performs a further nor-
malization to take into account the multiplicative nature of the
PRNU.
Unfortunately, the ease with which the PRNU can be ex-
tracted and the existence of relatively good theoretical mod-
els that explain its contribution lead to attacks that are simi-
lar in intention to digital forgery attacks in cryptography: the
so-called PRNU copy attack plants the fingerprint from a de-
sired camera in an image taken by a different device with the
purpose of incriminating someone or merely undermining the
credibility of PRNU-based forensics.
While the PRNU copy attack can be considered a threat
to trust, in this paper we identify risks to privacy by showing
that there is substantial information leakage into the PRNU
from the images used for its estimation. The existence of this
leakage has been already indirectly exploited in the so-called
triangle test [4], which is a countermeasure against the copy
attack that in order to detect the forgery relies on the high cor-
relation between the PRNU estimate with any of the image
residuals used in the estimation. However, to the best of our
knowledge, our work constitutes the first attempt at quantify-
ing such leakage by proposing two measures: one based on
the mutual information, and another based on the success rate
of a membership inference test. Although we do not explicitly
try to recover traces of the images used to extract the PRNU,
we show that the leakage is large enough to consider the pos-
sibility of recovery a serious threat. In this sense, we remark
that the images involved in criminal investigations are often of
extremely sensitive nature, like in cases involving child abuse
and other sexually-oriented crimes, so the mere existence of
this leakage calls for the implementation of effective protec-
tion mechanisms of the camera fingerprints that ensure that
privacy is preserved at all times during investigations.
Indeed, since law enforcement agencies are accostumed
to sharing robust hashes (e.g., those provided by Microsoft’s
PhotoDNA tool) in order to detect images of child exploita-
tion, there might be as well a predisposition to do so with
camera fingerprints. However, as our paper concludes, this
should be done only after carefully assessing the risks and
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considering all the possible remedies, some of which are pro-
posed and discussed in this paper. In particular, we believe
that working with encrypted data at all times [5], although yet
not entirely practical due to the large amount of computations
needed, is the most promising solution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Sect. 2
we review the basic principles of PRNU extraction; in Sect. 3
we propose two metrics to quantify the leakage; Sect. 4 con-
tains the results of experiments carried on images taken with
popular cameras; Sect. 5 briefly discusses several approaches
to mitigate the leakage, and, finally, Sect. 6 presents our con-
clusions.
1.1. Notation
Matrices, written in boldface, represent luminance images.
All are assumed to be of size M × N . The (k, l)th pixel
of image X is refered to as X[k, l]. Given two matrices,
X and Y, its Hadamard product Z = X ◦ Y is such that
Z[k, l] = X[k, l] · Y [k, l]. The Frobenius cross-product of
X and Y is defined as 〈X,Y〉F .= tr
(
XTY
)
, where tr(·)
denotes trace and T transpose. The all-one matrix is denoted
by 1. Random variables are written in capital letters, e.g., X ,
while realizations are in lowercase, e.g., x. Given two ran-
dom variables X,Y , X → Y means that X converges to Y
in probability.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, we will use the prevalent simplified sensor out-
put model presented in [1] in matrix form:
Y
.
= (1 + K) ◦X + N (1)
where Y is the output of the sensor, K is the multiplicative
PRNU term, X is the noise-free image and N collects all the
non-multiplicative noise sources.
This PRNU term can be estimated from a set of L images
{Y(i)}Li=1 coming from the same sensor. Firstly, the noise-
free image X(i) is estimated using a denoising filter,1 and this
estimate is used to obtain a residual W(i) .= Y(i)−Xˆ(i). Un-
der the assumption of N(i) being composed by i.i.d. samples
of a Gaussian process, the MLE estimator of K reduces to:
Kˆ =
(
L∑
i=1
W(i) ◦ Xˆ(i)
)
/ R (2)
where R .=
∑L
i=1 Xˆ
(i) ◦ Xˆ(i), and the division is point-
wise. Often, the result of this estimation contains non-unique
traces left by color interpolation, compression or other sys-
tematic errors, that are removed by post-processing (e.g.,
zero-meaning and Wiener filtering in the full-DFT domain).
1In the experiments carried out in this paper, we have used the popular
wavelet-based denoiser in [11].
Ideally, this PRNU will be a zero-mean white Gaussian pro-
cess with variance σ2k, independent of the location within the
matrix.
Unfortunately, the denoising process will not perform per-
fectly. In fact, the denoised image can be more accurately
modeled as:
Xˆ(i) =
(
X(i) −∆(i)
)
+
(
1−Ω(i)
)
◦K ◦X(i) (3)
where ∆(i) takes into account the traces of the noise-free im-
age that are left out by the denoising and
(
1−Ω(i)
)
models
the fraction of the PRNU-dependent component that passes
through the denoiser. Then, when subtracted to Y(i) and ap-
plied to the estimator, we have:
Kˆ =
∑L
i=1
(
Ω(i) ◦K ◦X(i) + ∆(i) + N(i)
)
◦ Xˆ(i)
R
(4)
Then, it is easy to show that (4) can be expressed as
Kˆ = Ω ◦K + Nk, (5)
where Ω .=
(∑L
i=1 Ω
(i) ◦ Xˆ(i) ◦X(i)
)
/ R is a function of
the used images and takes into account the amount of PRNU
removed in the denoising process, and Nk is estimation noise
that depends on both {∆(i)}Li=1 and {N(i) ◦ Xˆ(i)}Li=1, which
in turn convey contextual information about the images. Ex-
periments reported in [6] show that Nk can be well-modeled
by an independent Gaussian process with variance at the
(k, l)th position denoted by γ2[k, l] .
Fig. 1 illustrates a rather extreme case of leakage in which
the PRNU of a Xiaomi MI5S smartphone camera is estimated
from 25 images: the one on the upper panel plus 24 additional
dark images. As becomes evident, there is a lot of informa-
tion leaking from the first image into the estimated PRNU.
Although by no means this experiment describes a realistic
case, it does expose that such alarming leaks may well occur
in smaller areas of the image. A more systematic approach to
quantifying those leaks is presented in the next section.
3. QUANTIFYING THE LEAKAGE
In this section we discuss the two proposed measures to quan-
tify the leakage of the images used for PRNU estimation into
the estimate.
3.1. Information-theoretic Leakage
The first measure is based on mutual information of the set of
images used for the estimation {Y(i)}Li=1 and the estimated
PRNU Kˆ, i.e., I({Y(i)}Li=1, Kˆ). Since Nk is a function of
{Y(i)}Li=1, we can resort to the data processing inequality
to show that I({Y(i)}Li=1, Kˆ) ≥ I(Nk, Kˆ). The right hand
(a) Original image
(b) PRNU estimated from the image
Fig. 1. (a) Sample image containing textual information; (b)
PRNU extracted from 24 dark images and the image in (a)
side is considerably simpler to manage and produces an lower
bound on the leakage.
The main difficulty for the calculation of I(Nk, Kˆ) is the
lack of a complete statistical characterization for Ω. It has
been proven by Ihara [10] that given a Gaussian process X
with covariance Kx and a noise process Z with covariance
Kz , then the mutual information of X and X+Z is minimized
when Z is Gaussian with covariance Kz . Therefore, for a
given covariance matrix of Ω◦K, assuming that such process
is Gaussian-distributed with the same covariance will produce
a lower bound on the mutual information. Now, since K is
assumed to be white, its covariance matrix is σ2kIMN×MN .
Therefore, the covariance of Ω ◦K will be an MN ×MN
diagonal matrix with elements ω2[k, l]σ2k. Then, the lower-
bounding scenario corresponds to MN ×MN parallel chan-
nels, in which the ’desired’ signal (i.e., Nk) is transmitted on
each subchannel with power γ2[l, k] and there is an additive
Gaussian ’disturbance’ (corresponding to Ω ◦K) with power
ω2[k, l]σ2k.
Unfortunately, determining ω2[k, l]σ2k turns out to be a
difficult problem because even for moderate L the term Nk
dominates Ω ◦K in (5). One might think of using flat-field
images for this purpose, as in this case the contribution of
Nk would be negligible sooner as L increases. However, this
path is not advisable because with flat-field images the con-
tribution of Ω would be lost. Therefore, we must content
ourselves with estimating the trace of the covariance matrix
of Ω ◦ K, given by P .= σ2k
∑
l,j ω
2[l, j], and then use it
to produce a further lower bound on the mutual information.
The value P can be seen as the total disturbance power bud-
get that can be split among the different parallel channels in
order to minimize the mutual information. Notice that this
represents a worst case because in practice σ2kω
2[l, j] will de-
viate at each position (k, l) from such power distribution and
the actual leakage will be larger.
The mutual information in this case can be obtained
through the use of Lagrange multipliers, which give the fol-
lowing lower bound [9]:
I(Nk, Kˆ) ≥ 1
2
∑
l,j
log
(
1 +
2√
1 + 4/(µ · γ2[l, k])− 1
)
(6)
where µ is the solution to the equation
1
2
∑
k,l
γ2[l, k](
√
1 + 4/(µ · γ2[l, k])− 1) = P (7)
To estimate P , we propose to randomly split the set
{Y(i)}Li=1 into two subsets and estimate K from each. Let
Kˆ1, Kˆ2 be those estimates. Then, P can be estimated as
Pˆ = 〈Kˆ1, Kˆ2〉F . A better estimate can be obtained by re-
peating several times the splitting of {Y(i)}Li=1 and averaging
the resulting values of Pˆ .
We remark here that the leakage that we have quantified
through a lower bound corresponds to the complete set of im-
ages {Y(i)}Li=1 used for estimating Kˆ. This means that we
are not quantifying the leakage of a specific image, say, Y(j),
j ∈ {1, · · · , L}. Such problem, which is more difficult due
to the remaining images acting as a sort of interference, will
be the subject of a future work.
3.2. Membership inference
In the PRNU scenario a membership inference test [8] is a
binary hypothesis test that, given a PRNU estimate, classifies
a given image as having been used or not in the estimation.
This inference is possible due to the aforementioned leakage:
the higher the success rate in the membership inference test,
the larger the leakage. It is important to note that the number
L of images used in the estimation becomes a key parameter,
since as L increases the information provided by the other
images will dilute the individual contributions.
The potential recognition of the images used to estimate
the PRNU allows any malicious attacker to obtain information
about the input database, which may result in privacy risks in
certain scenarios. As an example, knowing whether certain
images were used to compute the PRNU may aid a convicted
criminal in identifying the informant who handed them to law
enforcement.
We derive two types of membership detectors: a
Neyman-Pearson-based (NP) detector and a normalized-
cross-correlation-based (NCC) detector. Even though the for-
mer is expected to perform better due to its statistical prop-
erties, along its derivation we will find that it requires in-
formation that is not readily available to a potential attacker.
Therefore, assuming knowledge of such information leads to
a ‘genie-based’ detector which is not practically realizable but
is useful as it sets an upper bound on the achievable perfor-
mance. In contrast, the NCC detector will behave (slightly)
worse but is perfectly implementable.
Let Y(r) be the image whose membership we want to
test and which is known to contain the true PRNU K. Note
that the available observations to implement the test are Xˆ(r),
W(r) and Kˆ. Then, two hypotheses can be formulated:
H0 : Kˆ =
(
L∑
i=1
W(i) ◦ Xˆ(i)
)
/ R (8)
H1 : Kˆ = Q +
 L∑
i=1,i6=r
W(i) ◦ Xˆ(i)
 / R (9)
where Q .=
(
W(r) ◦ Xˆ(r)
)
/R. Matrices(∑L
i=1 W
(i) ◦ Xˆ(i)
)
/ R and
(∑L
i=1,i6=r W
(i) ◦ Xˆ(i)
)
/ R
can be modeled as having independent zero-mean Gaussian
elements with variances at position (l, j) denoted by λ2l,j and
θ2l,j , respectively.
Let P .= Kˆ − Q. Then, applying the Neyman-Pearson
criterion [7], the following test is obtained:
JNP
.
=
∑
l,j
log(λl,j
θl,j
)
− (P [l, j])
2
2θ2l,j
+
(
Kˆ[l, j]
)2
2λ2l,j
 > ψ′
(10)
where ψ′ is a threshold selected so that a certain probability
of false positive is attained. In order to implement the test
above, the variances λ2l,j and θ
2
l,j are needed for all l, j. They
can be computed as the respective local variances at each po-
sition of Kˆ and P. Unfortunately, P is only available through
Q that in turn requires knowledge of R. Since the latter will
be in general unknown to an attacker, the NP detector must
be considered only of theoretical interest. Notice that when
L → ∞, then P → Kˆ and θ2l,j ≈ λ2l,j , for all l, j since the
information provided by an individual image is less signifi-
cant. As a consequence, when L → ∞ the membership test
is equivalent to guessing the outcome of (fair) coin tossing.2
2This should be reflected in ROC curves as following the ‘line-of-chance’,
As a realizable alternative to the NP detector, it is possible
to resort to the NCC of Kˆ and W(r), which has been already
employed in camera attribution scenarios [12]. This approach
relies on the availability of sample estimates of the respective
means (µˆk and µˆt) and variances (σˆ2k and σˆ
2
t ) of Kˆ and W
(r).
The resulting detection statistic becomes
JNCC
.
=
1
MN − 1
∑
l,j
(Kˆ[l, j]− µˆk)
σˆk
· (W
(r)[l, j]− µˆt)
σˆt
(11)
4. EXPERIMENTS
4.1. Experimental setup and results
We have carried out experiments to validate our measures on a
database of images taken with several commercially available
cameras listed in Table 1. The number of images per camera
ranges from 122 (Canon1100D#2) to 316 (Canon1100D#1).
We discuss the results separately for the mutual information
and the membership inference test.
4.2. Mutual information
In our first experiment, we have computed the lower bound
from (6) (heretofore denoted as Information Leakage Bound,
ILB, and measured in bits per pixel, bpp) for two different
values of L, namely L = 26 and L = 50. The results, shown
in Table 1 correspond to the average ILBs of 10 (resp. 5)
runs of the experiment with randomly chosen subsets of size
L = 26 (resp. L = 50).
Camera ILB (L = 26) ILB (L = 50)
NikonD60 1.6551 1.3458
Canon1100D#1 1.4007 1.1037
Canon1100D#2 1.7100 1.4092
Canon1100D#3 1.5962 1.2582
NikonD3000 1.4175 1.11467
NikonD3200 1.3827 1.0810
NikonD5100 1.9167 1.5768
Canon600D 0.8013 0.6791
NikonD7000 1.5246 1.2280
Table 1. Lower bound (6) for different cameras and sizes of
estimation sets.
As we can see, the leakage (as measured by the ILB), de-
creases significantly with L, as intuition confirms. This can
be explained by the fact that the disturbance power budget P
stays approximately constant, while the ‘desired’ signal Nk
reduces its power with L. In fact, notice that, as L → ∞
the term Nk is expected to go to zero due to the law of large
numbers. The relatively small ILBs observed for the Canon
cf. Sect. 3.2.
600D camera are conjectured to be due to the images in the
respective dataset being very similar to each other.
In our second experiment, we use images taken with a
the camera of a Xiaomi MI5S smartphone to build the fol-
lowing: sets 50brt and 50drk correspond to L = 50 im-
ages of respectively white and black cardboard, while in sets
49brt+berry and 49drk+berry one of the images is re-
placed by the one shown in Fig. 1a. The corresponding ILBs
are shown in Table 2.
50brt 50drk 49brt+berry 49drk+berry
0.447 0.794 0.446 0.827
Table 2. Lower bound (6) for flat-field images with and with-
out the image in Fig. 1a.
As we can see, dark images leak more information. Of
course, this leakage does not correspond to perceptually
meaningful information, but a look at (4) shows that noise
present in any ∆(i) or N(i) will be boosted by the small
denominator in (4), so that Nk becomes moderately large.
For an analogous reason, the opposite effect is observed with
bright images, for which the ILB is considerably smaller. Fur-
thermore, while the inclusion of the non-flat image does not
increase the information leakage of bright flat-field images,
because the former gets diluted in the latter when averaging,
this is not the case for dark images: the new image has a con-
siderable impact on Nk and thus contributes to a larger leak-
age. This is consistent with the empirical observation that it
is easier to extract traces from the image in Fig. 1a when av-
eraged with dark images (cf. Fig. 1b).
4.3. Membership inference
Aiming at testing the ability and accuracy of both NP and
NCC membership inference detectors, several experiments
were performed with PRNUs estimated from subsets of 50
images randomly selected from a set of 250 images captured
using the NikonD7000 camera. In Fig. 2 the outputs of the NP
and NCC detectors are represented for one such subset. The
first 50 samples correspond to the membership test statistics
for the 50 images used to estimate the PRNU. It is clear from
the graphs that both detectors can differentiate which images
were used in the estimation as a result of the leakage.
These results are confirmed by representing the ROC
curves for both detectors in Fig. 3 with L = 100 and L = 50.
From this figure the degradation when L increases is again
evident. In addition, the NP detector obtains better results, as
expected for its being derived from a likelihood ratio. In Fig.
3 the results for the camera Canon600D are also included.
From all our set of cameras, this was the only one in which
the membership inference method failed systematically. The
reasons why are to be researched yet; there may exist some
special property in the PRNU obtained from this camera that
hinders the desired information. In any case, these results
Fig. 2. Detection statistics for the two detectors on a set of 250
images (Nikon D7000 camera). First 50 images correspond to
those used in the PRNU estimation.
Fig. 3. Receiver operating characteristic for the NP detector
and the NCC, in case L = 100 and L = 50. Solid lines: Nikon
D7000; dashed lines: Canon 600D.
match those depicted in Tab. 1, where the lower bound on
the mutual information for this camera is the lowest between
all the tested devices. The excellent results obtained with the
NikonD7000 are also explainable from the ILBs in the table
since this particular model exhibits a high ILB. This confirms
the existence of a very close relationship between the mem-
bership identification and the lower bound expressed in Eq.
(6), which we intend to explore in the future.
5. LEAKAGE MITIGATION
Given the privacy risks that PRNU leakage entails, it is worth
considering potential mitigation strategies. Due to the lack
of space, we discuss them briefly here, and leave an in-depth
discussion for a future work. We classify countermeasures in
three categories: prevention, ‘deleaking’, and privacy preser-
vation.
Preventive methods aim at conditioning the estimation
process so that the resulting PRNU leaks less information.
This can be achieved, for instance, by increasing the num-
ber of images L whenever possible, maximize the use of flat-
field images, or improving denoising algorithms thus reduc-
ing ∆(i) and consequently the leakage, as shown in (4).
Deleaking methods consist in modyfing the estimated
PRNU in a way that has limited loss (even a gain) in the
PRNU detection performance, while decreasing the leakage.
Examples of this are PRNU compression methods (e.g. [13]),
but other possibilities exist, such as whitening the estimated
PRNU by normalizing by its local standard deviation at every
spatial position.
Finally, another approach is to limit the exposure of the
images and the PRNU in the clear using privacy-preserving
techniques. This is possible by carrying out the PRNU esti-
mation with encrypted images (and producing an encrypted
PRNU) and detecting the encrypted PRNUs from encrypted
query images [5]. This way, PRNU detection can be seen as
a zero-knowledge proof mechanism. Although this is a very
promising approach, substantial work is still needed to reduce
the computational complexity of the underlying methods so
that they become practical.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the leakage in the PRNU from the database of
images used for its estimation is revealed and lower-bounded
using a information-theoretic approach. Experimental results
show that this leakage is substantial and thus can entail sig-
nificant risks to privacy. As a consequence of this leakage,
membership identification based on the PRNU becomes pos-
sible, achieving high accuracy for both detectors proposed in
this paper.
An open problem which we expect to tackle in the near fu-
ture is how to use machine learning techniques to reconstruct
as reliably as possible the image database from the estimated
PRNU. This will illustrate even further the threats to privacy
and support the use of leakage mitigation techniques; these
will also constitute matter for future work.
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